

## PRE-SALE REPORT

# Pearl Mortgage Backed Securities 4 B.V.

RMBS/Prime/ Netherlands

### Expected Closing Date

[July 2010]

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### Analyst Contacts

Alix Faure  
Assistant Vice President  
33.1.5330.1038  
Alix.Faure@moodys.com

Stanislav Nastassine  
Analyst  
49.69.707.307.67  
Stanislav.Nastassine@moodys.com

» contacts continued on the last page

### ADDITIONAL CONTACTS:

Client Services Desks:  
London: 44.20.7772.5454  
clientservices.emea@moodys.com  
Monitoring: Monitor.rmbs@moodys.com  
Website: www.moodys.com

### Provisional (P) Ratings

CLASS	RATING	AMOUNT (MILLION)	% OF [NOTES/ ASSETS]	LEGAL FINAL MATURITY	COUPON	SUBORDI- NATION*	RESERVE FUND**	TOTAL CREDIT ENHANCE- MENT***
[A]	[Aaa]	€[0.0]	[93.1]	[July 2047]	[3mE +0.90%]	[6.9]%	[0.0]%	[6.9]%
[B]	[Baa1]	€[0.0]	[6.9]	[July 2047]	[3mE +0.90%]	[0]%	[0.0]%	[0.0]%
Total		€[0.0]	[100.00]					

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the legal final maturity. [In Moody's opinion the structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal at par on or before the rated final legal maturity date.] Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

\* At close.

\*\* As a % of [total/rated] notes

\*\*\* No benefit attributed to excess spread.

V Score for the sector (Dutch RMBS): *Low/Medium*

V Score for the subject transaction: *Low/Medium*

The subject transaction is a revolving cash securitisation of mortgage backed securities extended to obligors located in the Netherlands. The portfolio consists of mortgage loans secured by residential properties in the Netherlands.

### Asset Summary (Cut off date as of 30/05/2010)

Seller(s)/originator(s):	SNS Bank (A3/P-2)
Servicer(s):	SNS Bank (A3/P-2)
Receivables:	First lien prime mortgage loans to individuals secured by property located in the Netherlands.
Methodology Used:	» <a href="#">Moody's Approach to Rating Dutch RMBS, December 2004 (SF37202)</a> » <a href="#">Moody's Updated MILAN Methodology for Rating Dutch RMBS, September 2009 (SF125100)</a>

This pre-sale report addresses the structure and characteristics of the proposed transaction based on the information provided to Moody's as of 08- of July 2010. Investors should be aware that certain issues concerning this transaction have yet to be finalised. Upon conclusive review of all documents and legal information as well as any subsequent changes in information, Moody's will endeavour to assign definitive ratings to this transaction. The definitive ratings may differ from the provisional ratings set forth in this report. Moody's will disseminate the assignment of definitive ratings through its Client Service Desk. This report does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any securities, and it may not be used or circulated in connection with any such offer or solicitation

## Asset Summary (Continued)

Methodology Used:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» <a href="#">Moody's Updated Approach to NHG Mortgages in Rating Dutch RMBS, March 2009 (SF157265)</a></li> <li>» <a href="#">Moody's Updated Methodology for Set-Off in Dutch RMBS, November 2009 (SF179373)</a></li> <li>» <a href="#">Cash Flow Analysis in EMEA RMBS: Testing Features with the MARCO Model (Moody's Analyser of Residential Cash Flows), January 2006 (SF58290)</a></li> <li>» <a href="#">A Framework for Stressing House Prices in RMBS Transactions in EMEA, July 2008 (SF131751)</a></li> <li>» <a href="#">V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the Major EMEA RMBS Subsectors, April 2009 (SF158654)</a></li> <li>» <a href="#">Moody's Enhanced Approach to Originator Assessments in EMEA RMBS Transactions, October 2009 (SF153718)</a></li> </ul>
Models Used:	MILAN (Dutch settings) MARCO & ABSROM
Total Amount:	[1,037,499,664]€
Length of Revolving Period:	5 years
Number of Borrowers:	[5,974]
Borrower concentration:	Top 20 borrowers make up [0.67]% of the pool
WA Remaining Term:	[27.8] years
WA Seasoning:	[1.1] year
Interest Basis:	[97.4]% fixed rate
WA Current Loan to Foreclosure Value:	[97.0]%
WA Original Loan to Foreclosure Value:	[98.3]%
Moody's calculated WA indexed LTV:	[88.2]%
Borrower credit profile:	Prime borrowers eligible to NHG guarantee
Delinquency Status:	No loan is in arrears at the time of securitisation

## Liabilities, Credit Enhancement and Liquidity

Excess Spread At Closing:	[0.25%] annualised excess spread at closing
Credit Enhancement/Reserves:	[0.25%] Excess spread No reserve fund Subordination of the notes Guaranteed Investment Contract (GIC) account earning[EONIA minus 15 basis points]% on deposits
Form of Liquidity:	Liquidity facility, excess spread
Number of Interest Payments Covered by Liquidity:	[5.7] (based on a 0.5% Euribor 3 months assumption)
Interest Payments:	Quarterly in arrears on each payment date
Principal Payments:	Pass-through on each payment date
Payment Dates:	[18] of January, April, July and October First payment date: [18] of October 2010]
Hedging Arrangements:	Typical Dutch interest rate swap paying an excess margin of [0.25]% per annum applied to the principal amount outstanding of the notes (excluding the PDL) (see also below)

## Counterparties

Issuer:	PEARL Mortgage Backed Securities 4 B.V.
Sellers/Originators:	SNS Bank N.V. ("SNS Bank"; (A3/P-2)); SNS Regio Bank N.V. ("SNS Regio Bank") and BLG Hypotheekbank N.V. ("BLG"), both not rated
Contractual Servicer(s):	SNS Bank N.V.
Sub-Servicer(s):	Not appointed at closing
Back-up Servicer(s):	Not appointed at closing
Back-up Servicer Facilitator:	SNS Bank N.V.
Cash Manager:	SNS Bank N.V.
Back-up Cash Manager:	Not appointed at closing
Calculation Agent/Computational agent:	SNS Bank N.V.
Back-up Calculation/Computational Agent:	Not appointed at closing
Swap Counterparty:	Natixis (Aa3/P-1)
Issuer Account Bank/ GIC Provider:	Rabobank Nederland (Aaa/P-1)
Collection Account Bank:	SNS Bank, SNS Regio Bank and BLG
Paying Agent:	Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. (A2/P-1)
Security Trustee:	Stichting Security Trustee PEARL Mortgage Backed Securities 4
Issuer Administrator:	SNS Bank N.V.
Arranger:	SNS Bank N.V.
Lead Manager(s):	SNS Bank N.V.

## Moody's View

<b>Outlook for the Sector:</b>	Negative
<b>Unique Feature:</b>	Asset type and structure previously seen in market
<b>Degree of Linkage to Originator:</b>	SNS Bank, SNS Regio Bank and BLG act as the servicers and collection account banks. SNS Bank also act as issuer administrator. At close there is no back-up servicer nor any replacement triggers therefore increasing the linkage of the rating on the notes to the rating of SNS Bank
<b>Originator's Securitisation History:</b>	
# of Precedent Transactions in Sector:	21
% of Book Securitised:	26%
Behaviour of Precedent Transactions:	Delinquencies and losses reported on prior NHG transactions of these sellers are better than the average delinquency and losses reported in the Dutch NHG RMBS index. The outstanding transactions performed as expected and have not been subject to negative rating actions due to concerns about the collateral performance.
Key Differences between Subject and Precedent Transactions:	Standard Dutch prime securitisation in terms of assets and structure. This transaction is similar to the previous transactions but includes NHG mortgages loans originated by SNS Bank, SNS Regio Bank and BLG.
<b>Portfolio Relative Performance:</b>	
Expected Loss/Ranking:	[0.15]% in line with peer group
MILAN Aaa CE/Ranking:	[5.5]% in line with peer group
Weighted-Average Aaa Stress Rate For House Prices:	[30.3]%
<b>Potential Rating Sensitivity:</b>	
Chart Interpretation:	At the time the rating was assigned, the model output indicated that Class A would have achieved a [Aaa] rating even if the expected loss was as high as [0.45]% assuming MILAN Aaa CE remained at [5.5]% and all other factors were constant.
Factors Which Could Lead to a Downgrade:	

TABLE 1\*:

## Tranche [A]

		MILAN Aaa CE OUTPUT			
		[5.5]%	[6.6]%	[7.7]%	[8.8]%
<b>MEDIAN EXPECTED LOSS</b>	[0.15]%	Aaa*	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)
	[0.225]%	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aa1] (1)
	[0.3]%	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aa1] (1)
	[0.45]%	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aa1] (1)

\* Results under base case assumptions indicated by asterisk '\*'. Change in model-indicated rating (# of notches) is noted in parentheses.

## Composite V Score

BREAKDOWN OF THE V SCORES ASSIGNED TO		DUTCH PRIME SECTOR	TRANS- ACTION	REMARKS
Composite Score: Low/Medium				
"Low" reflects lowest level of uncertainty in estimating credit risk relative to other Structured Finance instruments.				
<b>1</b>	<b>Sector Historical Data Adequacy and Performance Variability</b>	<b>L/M</b>	<b>L/M</b>	
1.1	Quality of Historical Data for the Sector	L/M	L/M	» Same as sector score
1.2	Sector's Historical Performance Variability	L	L	» Same as sector score
1.3	Sector's Historical Downgrade Rate	L	L	» Same as sector score
<b>2</b>	<b>Issuer/Sponsor/Originator Historical Data Adequacy, Performance Variability and Quality of Disclosure</b>	<b>L/M</b>	<b>M</b>	
2.1	Quality of Historical Data for the Issuer/Sponsor/Originator	L/M	L	» Static performance data available on the originator's books. » Some dynamic performance available on the originator's books, including arrears and recovery rates. » Extensive information available on delinquencies and losses from precedent transactions (1999-2008).
2.2	Issuer/Sponsor/Originator's Historical Performance Variability	L	L	» The precedent NHG transactions performing better than the Dutch Prime NHG RMBS Index. » Historical performance is above Moody's expectations.
2.3	Disclosure of Securitisation Collateral Pool Characteristics	L/M	M	» Information received on underwriting criteria documentation was reasonable but some data missing in the MILAN input file such as employment data and loan purpose (missing for 100% of the pool). » No loan by loan insurance company counterparty data was provided
2.4	Disclosure of Securitisation Performance	L/M	L/M	» Investor report provides securitisation performance in line with other market participants. » Periodic loan-by-loan pool data will be provided to Moody's upon request
<b>3</b>	<b>Complexity and Market Value Sensitivity</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>L/M</b>	
3.1	Transaction Complexity	L/M	L/M	» In line with the Dutch prime sector.
3.2	Analytic Complexity	L/M	L/M	» The MILAN model (Dutch settings) was used. » The standard cash flow model was used.
3.3	Market Value Sensitivity	L/M	L/M	» The assets are secured financial assets whereby the underlying properties have a reasonably liquid secondary market.
<b>4</b>	<b>Governance</b>	<b>L/M</b>	<b>L/M</b>	
4.1	Experience of, Arrangements Among and Oversight of Transaction Parties	L	L	» In line with the Dutch prime sector.
4.2	Back-up Servicer Arrangement	L	L	» SNS Bank is rated (A3/P-2); SNS Regio Bank and BLG Hypotheekbank are wholly owned by SNS Bank.
4.3	Alignment of Interests	L/M	L/M	» Securitisation is a significant component of the funding strategy.
4.4	Legal, Regulatory, or Other Uncertainty	L/M	L/M	» In line with the Dutch prime sector.

## Strengths and Concerns

### Strengths:

- » **NHG guaranteed loans:** 100% of the loans are NHG guaranteed which should significantly reduce the losses incurred by the portfolio.
- » **Weighted-average LTV:** Weighted-average current LTV (based on valuation at origination) of [97.0]% is lower than similar NHG Dutch RMBS deals.
- » **Other support:** SNS Bank (A3/P2) guarantees the representations and warranties provided by all sellers.
- » **Hedging arrangements:** An interest rate swap agreement will guarantee the weighted-average margin on the notes plus excess spread of [0.25]%, and the senior costs.
- » **Liquidity Facility:** The availability of a cash advance facility provided by [SNS Bank] equal to [2.0]% of the outstanding balance of all the Classes of Notes (amortising with a minimum of [0.5]% of the initial outstanding balance). As SNS Bank is rated below P-1, the liquidity facility will be fully drawn from closing date.
- » **Sub-participation agreements:** These are in place to cover for set-off risk arising from saving mortgage loans. See the "Assets" section for more details
- » **Realised loss definition:** The realised loss definition includes set-off. This provides clarity in the transaction documentation with regard to what would happen if set-off occurred. By including set-off as a realised loss, set-off would lead to the creation of a principal deficiency ledger (PDL). As such, available excess spread can be applied to cover losses due to set-off.

### Concerns and Mitigants:


Moody's committees particularly focused on the following factors, listed in order of those most likely to affect the ratings:

- » **Low NHG pay-out ratio** compared to other Dutch originators. Moody's has taken this risk into account as further described in the "Treatments of Concerns" section.
- » **Assets substituting during 5 years (until the step-up date)** that could deteriorate the quality of the pool overtime. Moody's has taken this risk into account as further described in the "Treatments of Concerns" section.
- » **Set-off risk on the mortgage loans** with an insurance policy attached, as well as the savings deposit balances that borrowers have with SNS Bank. This is mitigated by the investment-grade rating of SNS Bank and the fact that a proportion of the life insurance policies are provided by third parties outside the SNS REAAL Group. Moody's has taken these factors into account when analyzing the set-off risk as further explained in "Assets" and "Treatments of Concerns" sections.
- » **High proportion of pure interest only loans (not associated with repayment vehicles) in the pool.** This risk is common in the Dutch prime RMBS transactions and has been treated by Moody's in its quantitative analysis as further explained in the "Treatment of Concerns" section below.
- » **No Reserve Fund** however liquidity concerns are mitigated to some extent by the cash advance facility to cover for potential interest and senior costs shortfalls.
- » **Economic conditions:** The Netherlands has been acutely impacted by a fall in world trade. In 2010, the economy is expected to grow by a modest 0.8% followed by 1.5% in 2011. Whilst unemployment is significantly below the rest of the Eurozone, the unemployment rate is expected to continue to increase and is forecast to increase to 7.9% in 2010. High levels of consumer leverage could leave consumer vulnerable to further rises in unemployment. Dutch house prices have stabilised in recent quarters after falling in H2 2008. The above has the following implications for the securitised pool: i) The pool has already experienced loss of equity in the underlying properties – although limited; ii) Economic prospects in the Netherlands are uncertain, with rising unemployment likely to drive delinquencies up in the short to medium term.

## Structure, Legal Aspects and Associated Risks

CHART 1

### Structure Chart



\* In its capacity as Seller, Seller Collection Account Provider, Issuer Administrator and Pool Servicer

\*\* In its capacity as Seller and Pool Servicer

#### Allocation of payments/pre accelerated revenue waterfall:

On each quarterly payment date, the issuer's available funds [(i.e. interest amounts received from the portfolio, under the swap agreement, and interest earned on the issuer's account)] will be applied in the following simplified order of priority:

1. Senior expenses;
2. Interest payments to swap counterparty and swap termination payments if the issuer is the defaulting party;
3. Interest on Class A; PDL on Class A; interest on Class B; PDL on Class B.

#### Allocation of payments/pre-accelerated principal waterfall:

On each quarterly payment date, the principal amounts received from the portfolio, under the swap agreement, and amounts applied to clear PDL will be applied in the following simplified order of priority:

1. Purchase of substitute receivables amount until end of the substitution period;
2. Principal payments in sequential order until repaid in full to Class A and Class B.

#### Allocation of payments/PDL-like mechanism:

A PDL is based on realised losses.

A realised loss is defined as the difference between the outstanding amount of the loan and any proceeds after the foreclosure of a mortgage loan. Furthermore, losses arising due to borrowers applying set-off has been included in the definition of realised loss.

By including set-off losses in the realised loss definition, set-off losses are crystallised and written to the principal deficiency ledger when they arise. Subsequently excess spread can be used to cover the losses due to set-off.

**Performance Triggers:**

TRIGGER	CONDITIONS	REMEDIES/CURE
Stop Substitution	<p>The payment date is beyond the [18/07/2015]</p> <p>An assignment notification event relating to the sellers has occurred</p> <p>More than [2.25]% of the outstanding amount of the loans is in arrears by more than 2 months</p> <p>The cumulative realised losses exceed [0.20]% of the initial amount of the assets</p> <p>Failure to repurchase assets by the sellers</p> <p>A debit balance has been recorded on any PDL and is not cured</p> <p>A drawing has been made under the liquidity facility that has not been repaid</p>	Stop substitution

**Reserve Fund:**

There is no reserve fund in the transaction.

**Liquidity:**

- » No principal to pay mechanism.
- » Liquidity facility provided by [SNS Bank].

**Subordination of interest:**

The payment of interest on Class B is on a junior position to the payment of interest on Class A.

**Assets:****Asset transfer:**

- » True Sale
- » Perfection of legal title through registration of the deed of assignment;
- » Borrowers are not notified of the assignment.

Although the registration of the deed of assignment eliminates the need for the notification of borrowers to perfect legal title, notification triggers have been added to the structure to minimise a potential commingling risk and to ensure the transfer of the payments by the borrowers to the issuer. Notification will take place, amongst others, upon one of the following events (assignment notification events):

1. Any seller (SNS Bank, BLG Hypotheekbank or SNS Regio Bank) defaults on a payment and the default is not remedied within 10 business days;
2. Any seller fails to comply with any of its obligations under the relevant agreements and such failure is not remedied within 10 business days;
3. SNS Bank's long-term rating falls below Baa1;
4. Suspension of payments or bankruptcy of any seller;
5. BLG and/or SNS Regio Bank cease to be subsidiaries of SNS Bank;
6. SNS Reaal N.V. (Baa1) withdraws its 403 declaration in respect of BLG /or SNS Regio Bank. The 403 declaration makes SNS Reaal N.V. jointly and severally liable for the

valid and binding contractual debt obligations of the subsidiary).

**Interest rate mismatch:**

- » Fixed-floating mismatch: At cut off date, [97.4]% of the pool balance comprises fixed rate mortgages. Remaining mortgages pay floating rate tied to the one-month Euribor. All the notes pay three-month Euribor. This leads to an interest rate mismatch in the transaction.

**Mitigant:**

- » To mitigate the interest rate mismatch, the issuer has entered into a swap agreement with the swap counterparty ([Natixis]) Under the swap agreement:

**The Issuer will Pay**

- » Scheduled interest received in collection accounts (less scheduled interest multiplied by the participation fraction on savings mortgages subject to a participation) ;
- » Plus: Interest accrued on transaction accounts;
- » Plus: Prepayment penalties received;
- » Minus: [0.25]% excess margin of the principal amount outstanding of the notes reduced by any unpaid PDL;
- » Minus: Senior expenses.

**The swap counterparty will pay:**

The coupon on the rated notes (Classes A and B). Swap counterparty will cover for any step-up.

- » Payments under the swap agreement will be netted.
- » The notional applicable to the swap counterparty is the principal amount outstanding of the rated notes reduced by any outstanding principal deficiency ledgers.
- » The swap framework is ISDA and is in line with Moody's swap criteria.

**Cash Commingling:** Payments by the borrowers under the mortgage loans are due on the first business day of each calendar month. All payments are collected by the respective servicers under a direct debit scheme into collection accounts maintained by each of the Sellers in the name of SNS Bank.

**Mitigant:**

- » Payments are transferred monthly from the collection account on the 8<sup>th</sup> business day of the month to the GIC account in the name of the SPV held by [RABOBANK].
- » Given SNS Bank is no longer Prime-1, it has opened an escrow account in the name of the Issuer and transferred an amount of [to be completed] equivalent to one month of principal, interest and pre-payment penalties received in similar transactions.
- » Following an assignment notification event (as described above), the borrowers will be instructed to pay all amounts due by them directly to the transaction account.

**Set-off:** Set-off risk exists in the balances of savings deposits and current accounts that the borrowers hold with SNS Bank and SNS Regio Bank (BLG represents that it does and will not take deposits).

- » As the Dutch tax framework permits a certain level of tax deductibility of interest on residential mortgages as well as the set up of independent tax efficient repayment vehicles, set-off is an additional risk in Dutch RMBS transactions. Repayment vehicles are usually in form of an insurance policy. In the event of a bankruptcy of the insurance company, which provided the borrower with the insurance/repayment policy, the possibility exists that the borrower offsets the value of his policy against the mortgage loan.
- » Currently [33.6]% of the pool is linked to savings mortgage loans, [18.1]% of the pool is linked to insurance policies, and [4.4]% of the pool is linked to investment mortgage loans. For more details on savings mortgages and investment mortgages refer to 'product description' in the 'collateral description' section below.

**Mitigant:**

- » Sub-participation agreements are in place to mitigate the set-off risk on the savings mortgage loans. Under a sub-participation agreement, the insurance companies pass on the premium received from the borrower to the issuer. The issuer will apply these amounts in the principal priority of payments as if they were principal repayments. In exchange the insurance company receives a participation in the mortgage loan.
- » Through this participation the insurance company becomes part owner of the mortgage loan. If a borrower succeeds in setting off the capital built-up in the savings policy following the insurance company's default, the participation of the insurance company in the mortgage loan is reduced by the amount set-off by the borrowers. Moody's believes that the set-off risk in relation to

savings mortgage loans is properly mitigated due to this sub-participation agreement.

- » Life insurance mortgage loans: In its updated approach, Moody's considers the set-off risk that may arise from the default of the life insurance providers. The methodology applied to account for this risk is detailed in "Moody's Updated Methodology for Set-Off in Dutch RMBS", published in November 2009 (see "Treatment of Concerns" below).
- » Moody's was provided with a list of counterparty names that provide the life insurance policies. Based on the available data, over [62]% of the counterparty exposure is linked to SNS REAAL N.V., Onderlinge Levensverzekering Maatschappij "'s-Gravenhage" U.A. and Fortis ASR Levensverzekeringen N.V.
- » Investment mortgage loans: the payments by the borrowers that accrue to repay the mortgage loan at maturity are held by a stichting (foundation) which is set up as a bankruptcy remote entity. Because of the segregation, the counterparty risk with respect to this product is mitigated and has not been taken into account by Moody's in its quantitative analysis.

**Loan substitution:** The sellers are able to substitute loans with a riskier profile in the pool.

**Mitigant:**

The key eligibility criteria for substituting loans are as follows:

- » All substituted loans must comply with the eligibility criteria
- » The aggregate amount of substituted assets should not represent more than [20]% of all mortgage loans on each payment date
- » The aggregate amount of interest only loans should not exceed [64]% of the aggregate outstanding amount of all the mortgage loans
- » The weighted average loan to foreclosure value of all mortgage loans should not exceed [97.4]%

Moody's considers that the triggers and criteria for substituting loans in the Pearl 4 pool are weaker than criteria seen in other Dutch RMBS transactions.

Please see "Treatment of concerns" section for more details on the stress applied in MILAN analysis to account for substitution in the transaction.

**Loan conversion** The sellers can amend loan conditions provided that after amendment the loan still complies with the eligibility criteria. In particular, sellers will not be able to grant further advances or release mortgage security without repurchasing back the loan from the issuer. Please see



“Treatment of concerns section for more details on how Moody’s took this element into account in its analysis.

**Further Advance:** The sellers cannot grant further advances to the loans already in the pool. If they elect to do so, they need first to repurchase the corresponding assets to the issuer.

**Payment Holiday:** The mortgage loans offered to clients in this transaction do not allow borrower’s payment holiday.

## Originator Profile, Servicer Profile and Operating Risks

Date of Operations Review: 22 of June 2010

### Originator Background: SNS Bank N.V , BLG Hypotheekbank N.V. and SNS Regio Bank N.V

Rating:	» SNS Bank N.V. (A3/P-2) (SNS Bank), BLG Hypotheekbank N.V. (Not Rated) (BLG Hypotheekbank) and SNS Regio Bank N.V. (Not Rated) (SNS Regio Bank)
Financial Institution Group Outlook for Sector:	» Negative
Ownership Structure:	» SNS REAAL (Baa1/P-2, negative outlook) is the holding company for SNS Bank (A3/P-2, negative outlook). BLG Hypotheekbank and SNS Regio Bank are not rated but are wholly owned subsidiaries of SNS Bank and are guaranteed (403) by SNS REAAL.
Asset Size:	» €80,289 million
% of Total Book Securitised:	» 26%
Transaction as % of Total Book:	» 1.3%
% of Transaction Retained:	» [. %]

#### ORIGINATOR ASSESSMENT

#### MAIN STRENGTHS (+) AND CHALLENGES(-)

Overall Assessment: Average

#### Originator Ability

Sales & Marketing Practices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Clear separation &amp; independence of sales and loan approval functions</li> <li>+ Sales staff have minimal or no influence on the development of the underwriting policy particularly exceptions for larger intermediaries</li> <li>+ Evidence of routine, pro-active management of underperforming counterparties/intermediaries</li> <li>- No branch origination (mitigant: strong controls in place)</li> </ul>
Underwriting Policies & Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Adherence to the Dutch Code of Conduct (market practice).</li> <li>+ Independent fraud team (fraud detection system is in place, which screens all loan applications).</li> <li>+/- 100% income verification (however BLG allows the intermediary to verify income).</li> <li>+/- No negative BKR-codes are allowed except cured A and A1 BKR codes, however BKR codes are not recorded</li> <li>- Exceptions to underwriting guidelines but signed off by middle office team (meet once a week)</li> <li>- High maximum LTFV of 125% (but in line with the Dutch market).</li> <li>- High proportion of IO loans (but in line with the Dutch market).</li> </ul>
Property Valuation Policies & Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Valuers are randomly selected from the originator's pre-approved panel of external valuers</li> <li>+ Full internal inspection</li> <li>+ Valuers are locally based and are of a relevant association and have pre-requisite qualifications</li> <li>- For LTV calculation the appraiser valuation is taken into account (a minimum of purchase price and appraiser value would be more conservative )</li> <li>- Tax valuation (WOZ) used for LTV &lt; 75% and value is haircut by 10%</li> </ul>
Closing Policies & Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Four eyes principles ensuring all documents, insurance is in place before disbursement of funds</li> <li>+ Check by independent notary (market standard)</li> <li>- Limited contact with borrower after loan is disbursed</li> </ul>
Credit Risk Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Credit risk management input is one of the primary drivers for change to credit policies</li> <li>+ Independence of the team, reporting to board level</li> </ul>
<b>Originator Stability</b>	
Quality Control & Audit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Checks of the documents by back-office before disbursement of loans.</li> <li>+ Internal audit framework (market standard).</li> <li>- Pool audit's results not received at issuance of provisional ratings (and poor past audits on previous transactions)</li> </ul>
Management Strength & Staff Quality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Experienced management and staff with low staff turnover relative to Dutch market.</li> <li>+ All new hires go through a formalised training programme including testing</li> <li>+ On-going training update and testing on product knowledge, on change in underwriting procedures, on regulatory and compliance and other specific job related training</li> </ul>
Technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Integrated and robust systems with minimal ability to manipulate data or circumvent rules</li> <li>+ Document scanning</li> <li>+ Field tested disaster recovery plan</li> <li>+ Regular (daily) data back-ups so the risk of data loss is minimal</li> <li>- Average quality data in the MILAN (loan purpose, employment, valuation type fields missing).</li> <li>- No counterparty data on a loan by loan level</li> </ul>

### Servicer Background: SNS Bank N.V , BLG Hypotheekbank N.V. and SNS Regio Bank N.V

Rating:	» SNS Bank N.V (A3/P-2), BLG Hypotheekbank (Not rated) and SNS Regio Bank (Not rated)	»
Total Number of Mortgages Serviced:	» Around 390,000	»
Number of Staff:	» 230 Employees (back office and middle office)	»

## SERVICER ASSESSMENT:

## MAIN STRENGTHS AND CHALLENGES

Overall Assessment:	Average
<b>Servicer Ability</b>	
Loan Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Actively monitors its delinquent portfolio on a daily basis</li> <li>+ Monitor insurance premiums payments, collateral amounts on saving mortgages and life insurance values.</li> <li>+ Pro-actively contact borrowers coming out of the teaser rate period/reset period</li> <li>+ Centralised servicing for each label</li> <li>+ 99% direct debits</li> <li>- Cannot run additional direct debits on non SNS bank accounts</li> </ul>
Early Arrears Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Different collection strategies based on borrower risk profile (Low, Medium and High)</li> <li>+ Visits by accounts manager (after 65 days in arrears) to identify the reason for non payment (since 2009) and help the borrower</li> <li>+ Strictly defined time line for arrears and default management</li> <li>+ Calling queues updated daily and priorities according to client risk profile</li> <li>- First call to "low" risk borrower on day 55 (mitigated by reminder letters sent to borrower before).</li> <li>- No contact with borrower after 75 days file is transferred to special services department</li> </ul>
Loss Mitigation and Asset Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Centralised special services depart dedicated to reviewing late arrears cases</li> <li>+ Collectors have no insight into whether a loan is securitised or not.</li> <li>+/- Recovery rates around 77% for the total book but higher recovery rate (&gt;85%) for NHG loans</li> <li>- Properties are bought by seller if minimum action bid is not reached</li> </ul>
<b>Servicer Stability</b>	
Management Strength & Staff Quality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Experienced management and staff</li> <li>+ Low turnover compared to industry average</li> </ul>
IT & Reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Full document imaging and single client view across operations, allowing access to all scanned documents</li> <li>+ Workflow system in place – letters sent automatically, priorities calling queues, automatic reminders and process cannot be influenced by collectors.</li> <li>+ Field tested disaster recovery plan</li> <li>+ Regular (daily) data back-ups so the risk of data loss is minimal</li> <li>+/- Will be migrating to a new work flow system over the next 6 months</li> </ul>
Quality control & Audit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Servicing operations audited every year</li> <li>+ All phone conversations recorded</li> </ul>
Strength of Back-up Servicer Arrangement:	» Not applicable

## Back-up Servicer Background:

Rating:	None appointed at close
Ownership Structure:	Not Applicable
Total Number of Receivables Serviced:	Not Applicable
Number of Staff:	Not Applicable
Type of back-up:	Not Applicable

## Receivable Administration:

Method of Payment of borrowers in the pool:	>99% Direct debit
% of Obligor with Account at Originator:	Approximately 54% with SNS Bank and 46% with another Dutch Bank
Distribution of Payment Dates:	All mortgage loans pay on or about the first business day of each calendar month

## Cash Manager Background: SNS Bank N.V

Rating:	A3/P-2
Main Responsibilities:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Directing amounts received by each Seller to the floating GIC account</li> <li>Obligation to make payments according to waterfall</li> <li>Draw on cash advance facility</li> <li>Preparation of investor report</li> </ul>
Calculation Timeline:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mortgage calculation period: period commencing on the 1- day of each calendar month and ending on the last day of such calendar month</li> <li>Mortgage payment date: 8- day of each month (cash is transferred from the Sellers collection accounts to the Issuer floating rate GIC account)</li> <li>Mortgage calculation date: 2- business days prior to each quarterly payment date in relation to the three successive mortgage calculation periods.</li> <li>Note calculation date: 2- business day prior to each quarterly payment date</li> <li>Quarterly payment dates: [18]th day of January, April, July, October</li> <li>Grace period under swap: 3 business days</li> </ul>

**Back-up Cash Manager Background:**

Back-up Cash Manager and Its Rating:	None appointed at closing
Main Responsibilities of Back-up Cash Manager:	Not applicable

**Originator/Servicer/Cash Manager Related Triggers**


Key Servicer Termination Events:	Insolvency, non performance of obligations
Appointment of Back-up Servicer Upon:	Not applicable
Key Cash Manager Termination Events:	Insolvency, non performance of obligations
Appointment of Back-up Cash Manager Upon:	Not applicable
Notification of Obligors of True Sale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» Any seller (SNS Bank, BLG Hypotheekbank or SNS Regio Bank) defaults on a payment and the default is not remedied within 10 business days;</li> <li>» Any seller fails to comply with any of its obligations under the relevant agreements and such failure is not remedied within 10 business days;</li> <li>» SNS Bank's long-term rating falls below Baa1;</li> <li>» Suspension of payments or bankruptcy of any seller;</li> <li>» BLG Hypotheekbank and/or SNS Regio Bank cease to be subsidiaries of SNS Bank;</li> <li>» SNS Reaal N.V. (Baa1) withdraws its 403 declaration in respect of BLG Hypotheekbank and/or SNS Regio Bank. The 403 declaration makes SNS Reaal N.V. jointly and severally liable for the valid and binding contractual debt obligations of the subsidiary).</li> </ul>
Conversion to Daily Sweep (if original sweep is not daily)	Not applicable
Notification of Redirection of Payments to SPV's Account	See Notification of Obligors of True Sale triggers
Accumulation of Set Off Reserve	Not Applicable
Accumulation of Liquidity Reserve	Not applicable
Set up Liquidity Facility	At Closing

## Collateral Description (provisional pool as of May 2010)

CHART 2

### Portfolio Breakdown by Year of Origination

Seasoning (Month of origination)




Source: Moody's Investors Service

CHART 3

### Portfolio Breakdown by Months Current


Months current (negative) and arrears (positive)



Source: Moody's Investors Service

CHART 4


### Portfolio Breakdown by LTV [original/current/indexed]



Source: Moody's Investors Service

CHART 5

### Portfolio Breakdown by Geography



Source: Moody's Investors Service

**Product Description:** The assets backing the notes are first-ranking prime mortgage loans originated by SNS Bank, BLG Hypotheekbank and SNS Regio Bank (Sellers). All the loans in the pool are secured on residential properties located in the Netherlands. All the loans benefit from the NHG guarantee. An NHG guarantee may be obtained by a borrower for a mortgage loan for the purchase, construction and/or refurbishment of a house or apartment in the Netherlands that is or will be occupied by the owner. The guarantee covers loss to the lender after the end of the foreclosure process for a defaulted borrower subject to a loss coverage formula. NHG loans are only granted provided certain strict eligibility conditions on the loan, borrower and property are met. Conditions also apply on the eventual claim made by the lender regarding the origination and servicing process.

The securitised portfolio consists of the following mortgage types:

- » Linear Mortgage Loans ([0.16]% of the pool): Under a linear mortgage loan the borrower pays a fixed amount of principal each month towards redemption of the relevant mortgage loan until maturity. Interest is payable monthly and is calculated on the outstanding balance of the mortgage loan.
- » Annuity Mortgage Loans ([1.25]% of the pool): Under an annuity mortgage loan, the borrower pays a fixed monthly instalment, made up of an initially high and thereafter decreasing interest portion and an initially low and thereafter increasing principal portion, and calculated in such manner that the annuity mortgage loan will be fully redeemed at maturity.
- » Interest-only/ bullet mortgage loans ([98.6]% of the pool): Under an interest-only mortgage loan, the borrower is not obliged to pay principal towards redemption of the relevant Mortgage Loan until maturity. Interest is payable monthly and is calculated

on the outstanding balance of the Mortgage Loan. The interest-only mortgage loans can have the benefit of a life insurance linked to it.

- Life Mortgage Loans ([18.1]% of the pool): Under a life mortgage loan, no principal is paid until maturity but instead the borrower pays a premium on a monthly basis to the relevant insurance company under a life insurance policy taken out with such insurance company. It is the intention that a life mortgage loan will be fully repaid by means of the proceeds of the life insurance policy.
- Investment Mortgage Loans ([4.4]% of the pool): Under an investment mortgage loan the borrower does not pay principal prior to the maturity of the mortgage loan, but instead undertakes to invest, on an instalment basis or up front, defined amounts in certain investment funds. The amounts invested take the form of participations in the investment funds selected by the borrower and are credited to the investment account in the name of the relevant borrower. It is the intention that an investment mortgage loan will be fully repaid with the proceeds of the investments held in the investment account.
- Savings Mortgage Loans ([33.6]% of the pool): A savings mortgage loan is combined with a savings insurance policy, which consists of a combined risk and capital insurance policy taken out by the borrower with an insurance company in connection with the relevant savings mortgage loan. Under a savings mortgage loan no principal is paid by the borrower prior to the maturity of the loan. Instead, the borrower pays a premium on a monthly basis, which consists of a risk element and a savings element. The savings premium is calculated that, on an annuity basis, the proceeds of the savings insurance policy due by the insurance company to the borrower will be equal to the amount due by the borrower to the seller at maturity of the savings mortgage loan.
- Bullet loans: [42.6]% of the pool: the borrower only pays interest and will repay principal at maturity.

### Eligibility Criteria:

The key eligibility criteria are as follows


- » Borrower is a resident of the Netherlands and not an employee of the Sellers;
- » Mortgage assets all benefit from an NHG guarantee
- » Mortgage assets cannot be in arrears for a period exceeding one month when transferred to the issuer;
- » Borrower has made at least one monthly payment under the relevant mortgage loan;
- » All mortgage asset are occupied by the borrowers at the moment of (or shortly after) origination;
- » Interest payments are scheduled to be made monthly;
- » The maximum outstanding principal amount of each mortgage receivable, or all mortgage receivables secured on the same mortgaged assets together, did not exceed 125 per cent. of the foreclosure value of the mortgaged assets upon origination of the mortgage receivable or mortgage receivables;
- » Where compulsory under the acceptance conditions used by the Sellers, each mortgage loan has a life insurance policy or risk insurance policy attached to it;
- » All mortgage loans are fully disbursed (no construction deposits /"bouwhypotheken")
- » The maximum initial mortgage term is 30 years.

### Credit Analysis

#### Precedent Transactions' Performance:


- » The performance of the originator's precedent transactions in this sector are above Moody's expectations.
- » Historical rating actions were taken in relation to the Pearl transactions due to Moody's NHG and set-off methodological revised approaches.
- » The SNS transactions when relating to non-NHG pools generally perform worst than the Dutch index. For instance Hermes X shows 60+ delinquencies of 0.32% (52 months since closing) vs.0.08% for the Dutch index. However when comparing SNS NHG transactions with the Dutch NHG index, it appears that these transactions perform better than the Dutch NHG index. For example, 2 years after closing Pearl 1 and Pearl 2 show respectively 0.17% and 0.24% 60+delinquencies while the Dutch NHG index shows 0.29%. To date, the Pearl transactions have not reported losses.

CHART 6  
60+ day delinquencies for HERMES series transactions




Source: Moody's Investors Service

CHART 7  
Cumulative Losses for HERMES series transactions



Source: Moody's Investors Services

CHART 8  
60+ day delinquencies for PEARL series transactions



Source: Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Performance Data Service, periodic investor/servicer report

**Data Quantity and Content:**

- » Moody's has received data from 1999 through 2009 reflecting (gross default/recoveries/ net defaults).
- » Moody's has received limited dynamic data from 2007 through 2010 reflecting arrears on the total mortgage portfolio originated by the 3 Sellers.
- » In Moody's view, the quantity and quality of data received is average compared to transactions which

have achieved high investment grade ratings in this sector.

- » The cumulative default rate per origination vintage is very low for NHG loans (between 0.2% and 0.7% 5 years after origination).
- » The average recovery rate exceeds 85% since 2004 for NHG loans.
- » The originator does not permit Moody's to disclose the historical loss/arrears information that has been made available to us. Moody's notes that the level of 90+ arrears is in line with that of other originators from the same market.

**Assumptions and definitions** Other values within a range of the notional amount listed below may result in achieving the same ratings.

**ASSUMPTIONS**

Median EL	[0.15]%
Milan AaaCE	[5.5]%
Spread compression / margin analysis	Not applicable – guaranteed excess margin of [0.25]% after senior fees and note interest via the interest rate swap
Stressed Fees	Not applicable (as hedged under the swap)

**DEFINITIONS**

WA coupon on the assets as per cut-off	4.5%
WA asset margin after reset	Not applicable – at the reset date borrowers can choose to re-fix the interest rate for different periods, generally ranging between five and 30 years at a rate as offered by the servicer
Asset reset date	[69.7]% of the pool is fixed for more than five years
Interest on cash	[Eonia – 15 bps]
Actual Fees	[0.135]% p.a. + [20,000 ]€ fixed fees
PDL Definition	Realised losses
Realised losses Definition	Include set-off risk

**Expected Loss:**

- » Moody's expected loss assumption is based on:
  - Performance of the originators' precedent transactions (PEARL transactions).
  - Performance of NHG loans as communicated by SNS (default rate assumption and recovery rate observed since 1999).
  - Benchmarking with comparable transactions in the Dutch market.
  - The current economic environment in the Netherlands in combination with historic loss data received from the originators (see also Charts 14 –16). Rising unemployment, currently at 5.2% with a forecast of 7.9% in 2010, is likely to drive

delinquencies up in the short to medium term. Additionally, house prices have been falling since their peak at end-2008 but stabilised in recent quarters: according to NVM, house prices were flat quarter-on-quarter in Q1 2010.

### Modelling Approach:

**Loss Distribution:** The first step in the analysis is to determine a loss distribution of the pool of mortgages to be securitised. Due to the large number of loans and supporting historical data, Moody's uses a continuous distribution to approximate the loss distribution: the lognormal distribution.

In order to determine the shape of the curve, two parameters are needed: the expected loss and the volatility around this expected loss. These parameters are derived from two important sources: historical loss data and the loan-by-loan model.

Moody's uses performance data provided by the originator in addition to other relevant data in order to extrapolate expected losses for the loan pool. Examples of data include market and sector wide performance data, the performance of other securitisations, and other originators' data.

To obtain the volatility under "stressed" scenarios, Moody's takes into account historical data. However observed historical volatility may not be significant (given insufficient data points, or incomplete data), and in addition may not be representative for the future as it is based on the previous economic environments experienced.

Consequently, Moody's determines a number representing the enhancement that would be required for a pool of mortgages to obtain a rating consistent with Aaa under highly stressed conditions. This enhancement number (the "MILAN Aaa CE" number) is produced by using a loan-by-loan model, which looks at each loan in the pool individually and based on its individual characteristics such as LTV or other identified drivers of risk, will produce a benchmark CE number. This assumes stressed recovery rates (through house price decline), time to recovery, interest rates and costs to foreclosure. The weighted-average benchmark CE number will then be adjusted according to positive and negative characteristics of each loan or of the pool as a whole to produce the MILAN Aaa CE number.

**Modelling assumption:** The MILAN Aaa CE number and the expected loss number form the basis of Rating Committee discussions and are used to derive the lognormal distribution of the pool losses

The standard deviation of the distribution is found by setting the expected loss of the area of the lognormal distribution beyond the MILAN Aaa CE equal to the

expected loss that is consistent with the idealised expected loss of a Aaa tranche.

**Tranching of the Notes:** Once the loss distribution of the pool under consideration has been computed, a cash flow model is used to assess the impact of structural features of the transaction. It calculates the average lives and the losses experienced by the notes for every loss scenario for the portfolio. Based on these numbers, the expected loss and the weighted-average lives for the notes are calculated as weighted averages based on the probabilities of the respective scenarios. The expected loss on each tranche together with the notes' weighted-average life determines the rating, which is consistent with Moody's target losses for each rating category.

The rating of the notes is therefore based on an analysis of:

- » The characteristics of the mortgage pool backing the notes
- » The relative roll-rate levels and arrears in this type of lending compared to conventional lending
- » Sector-wide and originator specific performance data
- » Protection provided by credit enhancement and liquidity support against defaults and arrears in the mortgage pool
- » The roles of the swap and hedging providers
- » The legal and structural integrity of the issue

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### Treatment of Concerns:

- » **Payment type:** [42.6]% of the loans are pure interest only loans. Moody's has applied a 25% penalty to these loans (standard MILAN penalty as per Moody's MILAN methodology). The adjustment leads to an increase in the MILAN Aaa CE number of [23] basis points.
- » **Employment type:** No employment information was provided. However, because only NHG loans to individuals are included in the pool, the standard "no data penalty" of 40% has been revised downwards to 30%, leading to an increase of the Milan CE benchmark of [81] basis points.
- » **Loan purpose:** although no loan purpose data was provided, SNS Bank has warranted that there are no construction loans, therefore Moody's did not apply penalty for the lack of data.
- » **NHG Loans:** The performance of the NHG guaranteed loans is highly dependent on the originator's compliance with the NHG criteria at the time of origination. To account for potential losses



Moody's has analyzed SNS's payout ratios in respect to NHG loans and the reasons for shortfalls, if any. The assumed rescission rate for the NHG-loans that is applied in MILAN is [45]% which is in the very high range of rescission rate modeled so far by Moody's.

- » **MILAN adjustments for loan substitution:** Moody's has considered that the LTV distribution of loans could worsen over time (although the WA LTFV is limited through substitution to the current level of the WALTFV). In addition, Moody's has modelled to the limit allowed during substitution the portion of interest only loans<sup>1</sup> ([64]% from currently [60.6]%).

Moody's has also removed any seasoning benefit after substitution (as no seasoning limit was included in the documentation during substitution).

The adjustments for substitution have led to a general increase of the MILAN number of by [90] basis points.

- » **Set-off:** We have taken three sources of set-off risk into account in the cash flow modelling:
  - **Set-off on savings-linked products:** For these loans, set-off risk is mitigated through a sub-participation structure where the periodic premiums will be passed through to the issuer. Special provisions have been entered into to get regular principal cash flows from the savings mortgages where the principal is not repaid before the final maturity of the loan. According to these provisions, the savings participants (SNS Bank) will immediately transfer the savings premium received from the borrower to the SPV. The accumulation of these premiums plus accrued interest reflects the principal amortisation of an annuity mortgage of the same size. The structure is therefore receiving on each monthly payment date an adequate amount of principal repayment from the savings mortgages, which in turn are used to repay the notes. The amounts advanced to the issuer by the savings participants will allow it to build up a participation in the relevant savings mortgage to ensure that the participant can still fulfil its obligations under the savings mortgage.


- **Set-off on insurance-linked products:** Moody's received a summary of the insurance company counterparties for the insurance linked products in the pool and used this information when assessing the credit loss. The set-off risk has been taken into account in the ratings of the notes by reducing the amount of credit support available to a class of notes with the expected loss due to set-off. Approximately [32]% of all insurance-linked products are linked to insurance policies provided by REAAL Levensverzekeringen N.V. currently not rated by Moody's. The senior unsecured rating of SNS Reaal N.V., the holding company of the group, is Baa1.
- **Set-off on deposits:** Moody's did not receive loan-by-loan data on borrowers' deposit amounts. However, the sellers did provide estimates on an aggregate basis. Moody's assumed a deposit set-off amount of [1.85]%, 1.5 times the actual level (1.23%) in the set-off modeling and assumed a counterparty rating of Baa1. This rating is lower than the current rating of SNS Bank, but allows for some de-linkage from the SNS Bank rating.
- » **Renegotiations:** The servicer can concede reductions of the interest rates that the borrowers pay or do some loan amendment provided that following the amendment the loan still complies with eligibility criteria.
- » **Repurchase option:** The servicer does not have repurchase option. However in order to grant further advances or loan modification resulting in the securitised loans not complying anymore with eligibility criteria, it will have to repurchase back the loan first. Claw back risk arising from future repurchase is limited in the Netherlands. In addition, deterioration of assets' quality resulting from substitution in the transaction is already accounted by Moody's when modelling substitution limits, therefore Moody's did not apply additional stress in relation to future assets repurchase in this transaction.

## Benchmark Analysis

Performance Relative to Sector: In Moody's view, the historical performance of 60+ delinquencies and losses of Pearl transactions compares positively to other transactions in this sector. Compared to its peer group of Dutch NHG transactions, the portfolio reflects lower delinquencies and loss trends.


In particular no loss has been recorded so far in the Pearl transactions.

**CHART 13**  
**60+Delinquencies for Dutch NHG Transactions over time**




Source: Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Performance Data Service, periodic investor/servicer reports

**CHART 14**  
**60+Delinquencies for Dutch NHG Transactions over time**



Source: Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Performance Data Service, periodic investor/servicer reports

**CHART 15**  
**Losses for Dutch NHG Transactions by seasoning**



Source: Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Performance Data Service, periodic investor/servicer reports

## Benchmark Table Best practice (non-exclusively NHG loans)

DEAL NAME	PEARL 4	HERMES XVB.V.	STORM 2010-I B.V.	DOLPHIN MASTER ISSUER SERIES 2010-II	DUTCH MBS XV B.V.
Closing date	July 2010	June 2010	April 2010	April 2010	March 2010
Information from	Closing pool as of 31 May 2010	Closing pool as of 31 May 2010	Final pool as of 28 February 2010	Provisional pool as of 28 February 2010	Final pool as of 1 February 2010
Originator	SNS Bank SNS Regio Bank, BLG Hypotheekbank	SNS Bank SNS Regio Bank, BLG Hypotheekbank	Obvion N.V.	FBN, FHB, DiBa, oosteroever, Quion 9	NIBC Bank N.V.
Servicer	SNS Bank SNS Regio Bank, BLG Hypotheekbank	SNS Bank SNS Regio Bank, BLG Hypotheekbank	Obvion N.V.	FBN, FHB, DiBa, oosteroever, Quion 9	NIBC Bank N.V.
MILAN Aaa CE	[5.5]%	5.4%	7.0%	7.9%	5.4%
Expected Loss	[0.15]%	0.75%	0.65%	0.65%	0.60%
<b>PORTFOLIO STRATIFICATION</b>					
Avg. Current LTFV*	97.0%	88.2%	94.7%	91.6%	94.9%
% Current LTFV > 100%	40.6%	30.6%	46.1%	49.4%	47.4%
% Current LTFV > 110%	13.2%	14.1%	36.7%	26.4%	36.2%
% Current LTFV > 125%	0%	0%	0.05%	3.4%	1.5%
Avg. Current LTFV indexed**	98.5%	90.5%	100.2%	89.9%	91.0%
% NHG guaranteed loans	100%	0.0%	5.2%	0.0%	0.94%
% Self Employed (incl.no data)	0.0%	0.0%	3.5%	1.4%	6.8%
% Self Certified	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
% Non-owner Occupied	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
% IO without collateral	42.6%	45.2%	77.5%	56.0%	56.5%
% IO with life insurance policy	18.1%	33.3%	6.3%	23.2%	31.5%
% IO with savings policy	33.6%	3.6%	11.6%	11.2%	9.9%
% IO with investment account	4.4%	8.1%	3.7%	8.9%	1.8%
% Fixed interest	97.4%	92.1%	93.1%	95.4%	95.5%
% in arrears	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%	0.0%
Highest regional concentration	Zuid Holland (16.8%)	Noord Brabant (19.0%)	Noord Brabant (19.4%)	Zuid Holland (27.4%)	Zuid Holland (24.5%)
<b>PORTFOLIO DATA</b>					
Current Balance	€1,037,499,664	€1,618,150,000	€1,000,000,000	€30,075,335,061	€746,250,000
Average Loan (Borrower)	€173,669	€183,839	€226,879	€183,777	€178,529
Borrower top 20 (as % of pool bal)	0.67%	0.85%	1.7%	0.07%	1.7%
WA interest rate	4.49%	4.74%	5.0%	4.8%	5.1%
Average seasoning in years	1.1	3.7	2.1	4.5	5.3
Average time to maturity in years	27.8	26.0	27.0	24.2	23.2
Maximum maturity date	1 May 2040	1 Aug. 2039	1 Dec. 2049	1 Sep 2089	1 Feb 2040
Average House Price stress rate <sup>§</sup>	40.1%	30.5%	30.3%	30.1%	30.2
Average House Price change <sup>§§</sup>	-1.5%	-2.6%	-5.5%	1.9%	4.2%
<b>STRUCTURAL FEATURES</b>					
Notes Payment Frequency	Quarterly	Quarterly	Quarterly	Quarterly	Monthly
Replenishment periods	5 years	Not applicable	Not applicable	Ongoing	Not applicable
Total Aaa size		92.7%	94.35%	93.0%	95.5%
RF at Closing <sup>§§§</sup>	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	0.9%	0.5%
RF Fully Funded at Closing?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
RF Floor <sup>§§§</sup>	Not applicable	Not applicable	1.3%, non-amortising	Non-amortising	Non-amortising
Hedge in place	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Swap rate or guaranteed XS (if applicable)	0.25%	0.35%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%
Principal to pay interest?	No	No	No	No	No

\* As per Moody's calculation.

\*\* Margin after all loans reset.

\*\*\*As per Moody's MILAN methodology for Aaa scenario.

· As per Moody's calculation.

° Of original note balance.

# BLG Hypotheekbank allows its intermediaries to verify income (21.54% of the pool)

^ All mortgage loans currently in arrears will be removed from the pool at close.

## Benchmark Table Best practice (NHG loans exclusively)

DEAL NAME	PEARL 4	GOLDFISH MASTER ISSUER B.V.	SOLID 2005-1 B.V.	STRONG 2007 B.V.	SOUND II B.V.
Closing date	July 2010	28 June 2010***	October 2005	December 2007	September 2007
Information from	Pool as of 31 May 2010	Pool as of 28 February 2010	Offering Circular / Moody's	Offering Circular / Moody's	Offering Circular / Moody's
Originator	SNS Bank SNS Regio Bank, BLG Hypotheekbank	FBN, FHB, DiBa, Oosteroever, Quion 9	Fortis ASR Bank, Fortis ASR Woning Hypotheeken, Fortis Hypotheek Bank	Obvion	NIBC Bank
Servicer	SNS Bank SNS Regio Bank, BLG Hypotheekbank	FBN, FHB, DiBa, Oosteroever, Quion 9	Fortis ASR Bank, Fortis ASR Woning Hypotheeken, Fortis Hypotheek Bank	Obvion	NIBC Bank
MILAN Aaa CE	[5.5]%	6.2%	3.7% <sup>††</sup>	3.1% <sup>††</sup>	2.6% <sup>††</sup>
Expected Loss	[0.15]%	0.20%	0.13% <sup>††</sup>	0.13% <sup>††</sup>	0.13% <sup>††</sup>
<b>PORTFOLIO STRATIFICATION</b>					
Avg. Current LTFV*	97.0%	100.9%	103.8%	102.4%	104.2%
% Current LTFV > 100%	40.6%	62.1%	65.4%	58.8%	70.4%
% Current LTFV > 110%	13.2%	48.8%	48.4%	48.0%	56.4%
% Current LTFV > 125%	0%	9.6%	9.9%	NPD	11.7%
Avg. Current LTFV indexed**	98.5%	99.6%	96.5%	NPD	NPD
% NHG guaranteed loans	100%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
% Self Employed (incl. no data)	0.0%	0.8% ND: 56.3%	0.9% ND: 77.4%	NPD	NPD
% Self Certified	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
% Non-owner Occupied	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	NPD	NPD
% IO without collateral	42.6%	39.9%	33.2%	49.6%	40.6%
% IO with life insurance policy	18.1%	26.1%	51.6%	19.9%	32.3%
% IO with savings policy	33.6%	22.8%	9.3%	21.5%	23.7%
% IO with investment account	4.4%	10.4%	5.6%	6.4%	2.0%
% Fixed interest	97.4%	97.5%	100.0%	99.7%	98.9%
% in arrears	0.0%	1.1%	0.9%	0.0%	NPD
Highest regional concentration	Zuid Holland (16.8%)	Zuid-Holland (30.6%)	Zuid-Holland (28.9%)	Zuid-Holland (17.8%)	Noord-Holland (29.7%)
<b>PORTFOLIO DATA</b>					
Current Balance	€1,037,499,664	€9,694,750,591	€601,900,000	€1,000,000,000	€750,000,000
Average Loan (Borrower)	€173,669	€155,869	€152,423	€174,812	€153,218
Borrower top 20 (as % of pool bal)	0.67%	0.07%	0.9%	NPD	NPD
WA interest rate	4.49%	4.5%	4.6%	4.6%	4.2%
Average seasoning in years	1.1	4.1	5.0	0.5	1.7
Average time to maturity in years	27.8	25.0	23.9	28.5	NPD
Maximum maturity date	1 May 2040		1 July 2085	NPD	1 Sept 2039
Average House Price stress rate <sup>§</sup>	30.2%	30.2%	30.2%	NPD	NPD
Average House Price change <sup>§§</sup>	-1.5%	1.4%	7.5%	NPD	NPD
<b>STRUCTURAL FEATURES</b>					
Notes Payment Frequency	Quarterly	Quarterly	Quarterly	Quarterly	Quarterly
Replenishment periods	5 years	Ongoing	5 years (November 2010)	10 years (November 2017)	3 years (September 2010)
Total Aaa size		93.8%	100.0% (A1) <sup>†</sup>	100.0% (A2) <sup>†</sup>	97.7% (Aa1) <sup>†</sup>
RF at Closing <sup>§§§</sup>	0.0%	0.0%	0.0% (€18,000)	0.1%	0.0%
RF Fully Funded at Closing?	No	Not applicable	Yes – but building up to €1,000,000 if portfolio is below 20% of initial)	Yes – but could build up to 2.5% subject to triggers	Not applicable
RF Floor <sup>§§§</sup>	Not applicable	Not applicable	See above	0.1%	Not applicable
Hedge in place	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Swap rate or guaranteed XS (if applicable)	0.25%	0.40%	0.50%	0.30%	0.0%
Principal to pay interest?	No	No	No	No	No

\* Loan-to-foreclosure value. The market standard in the Netherlands is to report foreclosure value. Moody's converts foreclosure value to market value using the following formula: foreclosure value \* 110% = market value

\*\* As per Moody's calculation.

\*\*\* Date of initial rating by Moody's.

§ As per Moody's MILAN methodology for Aaa scenario

§§ Of original note balance, excluding equity tranche.

On 6 July 2009 and 14 August 2009, Moody's took actions on a number of classes of notes of different Dutch NHG RMBS transactions, including PEARL Mortgage Securities 2, Solid 2005-1, Sound II and Strong 2007. These transactions currently don't have any notes rated Aaa outstanding anymore. The current rating of the most senior note is noted in brackets.

Updated MILAN and expected loss assumptions following the rating reviews in 2009.

Portfolio stratification and Portfolio data for Solid 2005-1 as per updated pool analysis (cut-off date 31 March 2009) for the purpose of the rating review (concluded 14 August 2009).

## Parameter Sensitivities

Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative, model-indicated calculation of the number of notches that a Moody's-rated structured finance security may vary if certain input parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged. It is not intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time, but rather, how the initial rating of the security might differ as certain key parameters vary. For more information on V Score and Parameter sensitivity methodology for RMBS, please refer to "[V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the Major EMEA RMBS Sectors](#)" published in April 2009.

Parameter sensitivities for this transaction were calculated in the following manner: Moody's assumed 16 loss distributions derived from the combinations of MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement: [5.5]% (base case), [6.6]% (base x 1.2), [7.7]% (base x 1.4) and [8.8]% (base x 1.6) and expected loss: [0.15]% (base case), [0.225]% (base x 1.5), [0.3]% (base x 2) and [0.45]% (base x 3). The [5.5]% / [0.15]% scenario would represent the base case assumptions used in the initial rating process.

The tables below show the parameter sensitivities for this transaction with respect to all Moody's rated tranches.

TABLE 2\*:

### Class A

		MILAN Aaa CE OUTPUT			
		[5.5]%	[6.6]%	[7.7]%	[8.8]%
MEDIAN EXPECTED LOSS	[0.15]%	Aaa*	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)
	[0.225]%	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aa1] (1)
	[0.3]%	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aa1] (1)
	[0.45]%	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aaa] (0)	[Aa1] (1)

\* Results under base case assumptions indicated by asterisk '\*'. Change in model-indicated rating (# of notches) is noted in parentheses.

TABLE 3\*:

### [Class B]

		MILAN Aaa CE OUTPUT			
		[5.5]%	[6.6]%	[7.7]%	[8.8]%
MEDIAN EXPECTED LOSS	[0.15]%	[Baa1]*	[Baa1] (0)	[Baa1] (0)	[Baa1] (0)
	[0.225]%	[Baa1] (0)	[Baa1] (0)	[Baa1] (0)	[Baa2] (1)
	[0.3]%	[Baa2] (1)	[Baa2] (1)	[Baa2] (1)	[Baa2] (1)
	[0.45]%	[Ba1] (3)	[Ba1] (3)	[Baa3] (2)	[Ba1] (3)

\* Results under base case assumptions indicated by asterisk '\*'. Change in model-indicated rating (# of notches) is noted in parentheses.

**Worse case scenarios:** At the time the rating was assigned, the model output indicated that Class A would have achieved the Aaa rating even if expected loss was as high as [0.45]% assuming MILAN Aaa CE remained at [5.5]% and all other factors remained the same. The model output further indicated that the Class A would not have been assigned a Aaa

rating with MILAN Aaa CE of [8.8]%, and expected loss of [0.225]%.

## Monitoring

Moody's will monitor the transaction on an ongoing basis to ensure that it continues to perform in the manner expected, including checking all supporting ratings and reviewing periodic servicing reports. Any subsequent changes in the rating will be publicly announced and disseminated through Moody's Client Service Desk.

**Originators' Linkage:** The sellers play the role of servicer. Amongst the sellers, SNS Bank plays also the roles of issuer administrator, cash manager and cash advance facility provider in this transaction.

**Significant Influences:** In addition to the counterparty issues noted, the following factors may have a significant impact on the subject transaction's ratings:

- » Deterioration of the general economic environment and specifically, the real estate market beyond the current consensus.
- » Default of other counterparties that are involved in the transaction (this risk is mitigated by implemented triggers).

### COUNTERPARTY RATING

TRIGGERS	CONDITION	REMEDIES
Interest Rate Swap Counterparty	In accordance with Moody's swap guidelines*	
Issuer Account Bank	Loss of P-1	Replace
GIC Account Bank	Loss of P-1	Replace
Cash Advance Facility Provider	Loss of P-1	Replace or drawn fully
Servicer or cash manager	Loss of Baa3	SNS acting as facilitator to identify back-up counterparties

\* See Framework for De-Linking Hedge Counterparty Risks from Global Structured Finance Transactions Moody's Methodology, May 15 2006.

### Loan repurchase following breach of representations & warranties (R&W):

- » Each month SNS Bank will automatically perform a check of R&W.
- » The originators have not provided historical data on the loans repurchase due to breach of R&W.

### Monitoring Report:

#### Data Quality:

- » Investor report format is finalised.
- » The report includes all necessary information for Moody's to monitor the transaction.

- » No undertaking to periodically provide Moody's with updated pool cut.

Data Availability:

- » Report provided by: SNS Financial Markets
- » The timeline for investor report is not provided in the transaction documentation, The priority of payment section is not published on the IPD.
- » The completed report is published 3 days before the IPD.
- » The frequency of the publication of the investor report is quarterly and the frequency of the IPD is quarterly.
- » Investor reports is publicly available on a website.

## Moody's Related Research

For a more detailed explanation of Moody's approach to this type of transaction as well as similar transactions please refer to the following reports:

### Rating Methodologies:

- » [Moody's Approach to Rating UK RMBS, April 2005 \(SF47735\)](#)
- » [Moody's Updated Methodology for Rating UK RMBS, Sept 2009 \(SF112854\)](#)
- » [Moody's Approach to Rating Dutch RMBS, December 2004 \(SF37202\)](#)
- » [Moody's Updated MILAN Methodology for Rating Dutch RMBS, September 2009 \(SF125100\)](#)
- » [Moody's Approach to Rating Italian RMBS, December 2004 \(SF37242\)](#)
- » [Moody's Approach to Rating Portuguese RMBS, October 2004 \(SF45081\)](#)
- » [Moody's Approach to Rating French RMBS, October 2005 \(SF62372\)](#)
- » [Moody's Updated Methodology for Rating Spanish RMBS, October 2009 \(SF133138\)](#)
- » [Moody's Updated Methodology for Rating Spanish Government Sponsored Housing \(VPO\), September 2009 \(SF151453\)](#)
- » [Moody's Updated MILAN Methodology for Rating German RMBS, September 2009 \(SF154503\)](#)
- » [Moody's MILAN Methodology for Rating Irish RMBS, April 2009 \(SF132670\)](#)
- » [Moody's Approach to Rating South African RMBS, January 2005 \(SF34788\)](#)
- » [Moody's Methodology for Rating Greek RMBS, October 2009 \(SF139562\)](#)
- » [Moody's Approach to Rating Belgian RMBS, September 2006 \(SF79604\)](#)
- » [Moody's Approach to Rating Swiss RMBS, December 2004 \(SF39456\)](#)
- » [Moody's Updated Approach to NHG Mortgages in Rating Dutch RMBS, March 2009 \(SF157265\)](#)
- » [Moody's Updated Methodology for Set-Off in Dutch RMBS, November 2009 \(SF179373\)](#)
- » [Moody's RMBS Master Trust Cash Flow Analysis, April 2008 \(SF130296\)](#)
- » [Cash Flow Analysis in EMEA RMBS: Testing Features with the MARCO Model \(Moody's Analyser of Residential Cash Flows\), January 2006 \(SF58290\)](#)
- » [Cash Flow Analysis of Synthetic ABS/RMBS Transactions, September 2009 \(SF143743\)](#)
- » [Interest Rate Risk in UK RMBS – Moody's Approach, October 2007 \(SF110489\)](#)
- » [Moody's Approach to Automated Valuation Models in Rating UK RMBS, August 2008 \(SF121128\)](#)
- » [A Framework for Stressing House Prices in RMBS Transactions in EMEA, July 2008 \(SF131751\)](#)
- » [V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the Major EMEA RMBS Subsectors, April 2009 \(SF158654\)](#)

### Credit Opinions

- » [SNS Bank](#)
- » [Natixis](#)

### New Issue Reports

- » [Pearl Mortgage Backed Securities 1 B.V., September 2006 \(SF82952\)](#)
- » [Pearl Mortgage Backed Securities 2 B.V., June 2007 \(SF99905\)](#)

### Special Reports

- » [Investor/Servicer Reports: Important Considerations for Moody's Surveillance of EMEA ABS and RMBS Transactions, June 2009 \(SF154502\)](#)
- » [Substitution Criteria in EMEA RMBS Revolving Transactions, September 2009 \(SF178124\)](#)

### Index Report

- » [Dutch Prime RMBS Indices April 2010, June 2010 \(SF207584\)](#)

To access any of these reports, click on the entry above. Note that these references are current as of the date of publication of this report and that more recent reports may be available. All research may not be available to all clients.



## Appendix 1: Summary of Originator's Underwriting Policies and Procedures

ORIGINATOR ABILITY	AT CLOSING
<b>Sales and Marketing Practices</b>	
Origination channels:	74% intermediaries and 26% branches
<b>Underwriting Procedures</b>	
Underwriting composition	100% by each lender's centralised office
Ratio of loans underwritten per FTE* per day:	4 to 5 files reviewed per day
Average experience in underwriting:	Not Provided
Criteria for compensation of underwriters	100% base pay and up to 15% bonus (as a percentage of total compensation)
Approval rate:	+65% of all application approved
Percentage of exceptions to underwriting policies:	Not Provided
<b>Underwriting Policies</b>	
Source of credit history checks:	Internal database, external database: Dutch Credit Bureau (BKR)
Methods used to assess borrowers' repayment capabilities:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» Debt to income ratio in according to NIBUD/NHG criteria</li> <li>» Income multiple is determined by age and LTV limits as set out in the Code of Conduct.</li> <li>» The relevant Seller calculates the maximum proportion of a Borrower's income that may be applied to service principal and interest on the mortgage loan and the entire Borrower's other financial commitments.</li> <li>» The income test looks at the client's mortgage expenses using the applicable mortgage rate and an annuity redemption for a maximum period of 30 years (in case the interest fixing period is less than 10 years then the reference rate to be used will be the then prevalent yield on a 10 year Dutch government bond + 1% )</li> <li>» Income verification "entrepreneur" via specialised desk at the Mid-Office</li> <li>» 3 years of income is considered and tax return checked for self employed borrower.</li> </ul>
Income taken into account in affordability calculations:	Gross income; includes: 100% base salary, 37.5 % overtime, 60% state benefit and 85% investment income (incl rental income)
Other borrower's exposures (i.e. other debts) taken into account in affordability calculations:	Living expenses are taken care of in the DTI calculation and is calculated by NIBUD. This forms part of the maximum DTI that is applicable to each income band. Deduct alimony costs and other loans that the client has outstanding.
Is interest rate stressed to calculate affordability?	No
Affordability for I/O/balloon loans:	Based on Principal & actual interest
Method used for income verification:	Specify: "Werkgeversverklaring" form is filled out by the employer that states the yearly income of the borrower and signed by employer, sometimes call employer
Criteria for non income verified:	Not applicable
Max age loan maturity:	30 years
Maximum loan size:	Not Provided
Valuation types used for purchase:	Full valuation which include an internal inspection of the property. LTV's less than 75% may use the tax (WOZ) valuation which is haircut by 10%.
<b>Collateral Valuation Policies and Procedures</b>	
Value in the LTV calculation/ in the IT system:	Appraisal valuation used
Type, qualification and appointment of valuers:	External valuers who is a member of an accredited association such as NRVT, SCVM or CERT / MKB. Appointed by lender through it internal panel
<b>Closing Policies and Procedures</b>	
Quality check before releasing funds:	All document received and insurance in place before loan is dispersed.
<b>Credit Risk Management</b>	
Reporting line of Chief Risk Officer :	Board of Directors
Track loan performance by loan characteristics?	Yes, Credit risk team is responsible for analysing the credit risk in the portfolio and they report to senior management on underlying trends and performance of the mortgage.

\* FTE: Full Time Equivalent

ORIGINATOR STABILITY:	AT CLOSING
<b>Quality Controls and Audits</b>	
Responsibility of quality assurance:	Internal control audit is performed by a separate quality team
Number of files per underwriter per month being monitored:	Each Quarter an audit on 50 mortgage loan files is performed
<b>Management Strength and Staff Quality</b>	
Training of new hires and existing staff:	Formalised underwriting induction programme and ongoing on the job training
<b>Technology</b>	
Tools/infrastructure available:	Loan file scanning; workflow system; automatic feed from credit bureaus. Intends to migrate to a new database with more information on mortgage products in the next 6 to 12 months

## Appendix 2: Summary of Servicer's Collection Procedures

SERVICER ABILITY	AT CLOSING
<b>Loan Administration</b>	
Entities involved in loan administration:	Centralised at head office for each label
Operating hours:	Mon to Fri 7:30 to 21:00, Account managers can visit the borrower on the weekend if required
<b>Early Arrears Management</b>	
Entities involved in early stage arrears:	Centralised at head office for each label
Ratio of loans per collector (FTE) in early arrears stage:	Not Provided
Early Arrears strategy	Delinquent files are prioritised based on risk category Low: Below EUR 500 expected loss Medium: between EUR 500 and EUR 2,500 expected loss High: Higher than EUR 2,500 expected loss Low risk client (80% of arrears book) no initial call contact only letters are sent (day 4, day 20 and day 55) If no response the 1st call made on day 55 High risk clients (20% of arrears book) 1st call on day 4 Letter is sent automatically after 10 days If there is no response, client is contacted again before second reminder letter sent on day 20 . If no contact is made borrower is redirected to the special services department who will then start foreclosure process. Accounts Managers visit face to face with the distressed client (60 days after missed payment)
Prioritisation rules for delinquent accounts:	Depending on risk profile of borrower
Use of updated information in the collection strategy:	Not Provided
<b>Loss Mitigation and Asset Management Practices:</b>	
Transfer of a loan to the late stage arrears team/stage:	After 90 days (loan classified as default)
Entities involved in late stage arrears:	Centralised at head office for each label, special services team and legal team
Ratio of loans per collector (FTE) in late arrears stage:	Not Provided
Analysis performed to assess/propose loss mitigation solutions:	Accounts Manager during early arrears will get an updated income and expenditure from the borrower, Collector prepares the file for the special servicer team recommending the course of action Updated valuation is done Special services team will review the proposal and decide on best action which could take the form of a payment plan or foreclosure.
Time from first default to litigation and from litigation to sale:	12 months from first default to litigation; 6 months from litigation to sale
Average recovery rate (including accrued interest & costs):	77% average recovery between the three labels for the total book
<b>SERVICER STABILITY</b>	
<b>Management and Staff</b>	
Average experience in servicing or tenure with company:	Head of Arrears Management has been with SNS for 10 years and heading the department for 5 years
Training of new hires specific to the servicing function (i.e. excluding the company induction training)	Not Provided
<b>Quality control and audit</b>	
Responsibility of quality assurance:	Independent team (include the number of staff) reporting directly to the board. Annual audits performed.
Number of files (and calls) per agent per month being monitored:	Not Provided
<b>IT and Reporting</b>	
Tools/infrastructure available:	Workflow system, scanning correspondence, call recording capability; automatic feed from credit bureau for regular updates
Automatic tracking and reporting of specific characteristics:	Yes, automatic reminders

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<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of the substitution criterion, savings and insurance linked mortgage loans are not included in the “interest only” definition.

» contacts continued from page 1

## Analyst Contacts

Christophe de Noaillet  
Senior Vice President  
44.20.7772.5536  
Christophe.deNoaillet@moodys.com

Neal Shah  
Managing Director  
44.20.7772.5440  
Neal.Shah@moodys.com

## ADDITIONAL CONTACTS:

Frankfurt: 49.69.2222.7847  
London: 44.20.7772.5454  
Madrid: 34.91.4143.161  
Milan: 39.023.6006.333  
Paris: 33.17.0702.229

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